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I. Introduction
The year 1969 produced little in the way of legislation
affecting administrative law, and the cases reviewing administrative action noted here are not necessarily included because
they indicate anything new, but because they indicate someone did not understand what is old.
The decisions of the Department of Motor Vehicles, in particular, have been the subject of most of the litigation during
224
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the past year. These cases present most clearly the struggle
of the courts to evolve some unifying principles in the application of the law to the driver who drinks. Not all the cases are
in harmony, but trends seem to be developing.

II. Driver's License-Implied Consent Law
The avalanche of cases arising under the Implied Consent
Law 1 continues unabated. This law requires the Department
of Motor Vehicles to suspend for six months the driving privileges (1) of a person who is arrested 2 for any offense committed while driving on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (2) where a peace officer has
reasonable cause to believe that such person has been driving
on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, (3) where the individual has been advised that the failure to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic
content of his blood will result in the suspension of his driving
privileges and (4) where he refuses to submit to the test.
Under the statute, the person has the right to choose whether
the test will be of his blood, breath, or urine, and, by specific
amendment enacted in 1969, he has the right to be told that
he has this choice. 3
The results of chemical tests give rise to presumptions relating to the intoxication of the driver. 4
It has been determined that a driver who, under the above
circumstances, has been requested to submit to a chemical
test, has no right to the presence of counsel at the time of the
request or at the time of the administration of the test. s A
problem has arisen, however, in cases where the driver has
been given the so-called Miranda warning before he is request1. Vehicle Code § 13353.
2. An arrest for drunk driving of a
person involved in a traffic accident
may be made without a warrant upon
reasonable
cause.
Vehicle Code
§ 40300.5. added Stats. 1969, Ch. 956.
3. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1439.
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4. Vehicle Code
Stats. 1969, Ch. 231.

§

23126,

added

5. Ent v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 265 Cal. App.2d 936, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1968); Wegner v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 271 Cal. App.
2d 838. 76 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969).
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ed to submit to the chemical test. 6 In some of the cases, the
driver claimed that he was confused by the Miranda warning
and that where he, because of the confusion, refused to submit to the test until his attorney arrived or he consulted with
him, he should not be held to have refused. Where a person
is given the Miranda warning and then is requested to do
something by the police, if what he is asked to do is quite
similar to what he is told he has a right not to do under the
Miranda warning, his failure to do what the police have asked
him to do may be the result of confusion, and should not be
used against him.7 In the cases of Finley v. Orr 8 and Fallis v.
Department of M afar Vehicles, 9 the courts were so impressed
by the fact that each driver had engaged in conversation and
responded in an uninhibited fashion to the warning, that his
later contention that the Miranda warning had confused him
seemed unreal.
In Reirdon v. Director, Department of Motor Vehicles/o
the policeman who made the demand that the driver submit
to the chemical test not only gave the Miranda warning, but
fully explained to the petitioner that he had the right to counsel
only in connection with the criminal charge of driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and
further told him that he did not have the right to have an attorney present with him in the jail at the time the chemical test
was being performed. Consequently, the Court determined
that the petitioner was not justified in refusing to take the test
until an attorney was present. He had been clearly and unequivocally told that he had no right to the presence of counsel. Therefore, his contention of bewilderment was not at all
persuasive.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
10 AL.R.3d 974 (1966).
7. The court cited People v. Ellis,
65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421
P.2d 393 (1966); see also Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal.
App.2d 936, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1968).
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In Rust v. Department at Motor Vehicles,ll the Miranda
warning had been given, and the driver refused to take the
test until he talked to his attorney. The trial court held for
the driver, and the reviewing Court affirmed the trial court.
The trial court found that the driver had not unequivocally
rejected the test in such a way as to excuse the peace officer
from supplying further information. Consequently, the reviewing Court determined that where the officer introduced
the question of the right to counsel, and it became evident
that the driver thought he was entitled to an attorney and may
have misconceived the warning, the officer should have elaborated by stating that the warning was inapplicable to the
blood-alcohol test. The Court cited Reirdon as an example
of a situation where the proper instruction had been given.
Strangely, the Court relied upon People v. Ellis/ 2 although a
careful reading of Ellis will indicate that there could be no
possible confusion between the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel, and the duty to submit to a test. Nevertheless, Ellis is cited as the genesis for this result.
'In Kingston v. Department at Motor Vehicles/ 3 the Court
determined that where the Miranda warning was given and the
driver stated that he wanted to see his attorney, it was conceivable that the driver, as in Rust, could have misinterpreted
the Miranda warning. If so, he was entitled to a further
elaboration by the peace officer before his request to see his
attorney was treated as an outright refusal to take the test.
The driver was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he
had so misinterpreted the Miranda warning.
In Weber v. Orr,l4 the Rust issue was not raised before
either the Department or the Superior Court; it was raised for
the first time before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, following the lead in Wethern v. Orr/ 6 held that where
the Miranda warning was given and the driver demanded
11. 267 Cal. App.2d 545, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 366 (1968).
12. 65 Cal.2d 529, 539, 55 Cal. Rptr.
385, 390, 421 P.2d 393, 398 (1966).
13. 271 Cal. App.2d 549, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 614 (1969).
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Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal.
(1969).
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counsel, the driver could not be required to take the test in
the absence of a further explanation that his constitutional
rights did not apply to the decision to submit or not to submit
to a test under Vehicle Code section 13353.
Wethern and Weber, then, treated as a matter of law the
fact that confusion can exist under these circumstances.
The trial court in Walker v. Department of Motor Vehicles16
denied the relief sought by the driver. The reviewing Court
was faced with the Rust issue, and found that the Superior
Court had considered whether the appellant was confused
and misled by the Miranda warning, and had determined that
there was no such confusion. The Court said:
There is no basis for the contention that the juxtaposition of the Miranda warning and the statutory demand
for a test vitiate the latter as a matter of law. The statement of the officer that 'you are entitled to an attorney
throughout the entire interview' is not literally inconsistent with the requirement that he take a blood, breath
or urine test without waiting for his attorney. Although
the Rust opinion advises the officers to tell the arrestee
that the right to counsel does not apply to the chemical
test, it does not create a new un statutory condition precedent to the application of section 13353 [The Implied
Consent Law V 7
The Court seems to take issue with Wethern, and states:
If Wethern is read as holding that, as a matter of law,
the Miranda warning excuses the driver's refusal to take
the chemical test, it is inconsistent with the [holding]
in Kingston. In [that] case the appellate court refrained
from deciding that the driver was excused as a matter of
law, and sent the case back for trial on the issue of facets
The reviewing Court in Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles19 announced that the driver was not entitled to consult

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

16.
Rptr.
17.
Rptr.
228

274
433
274
433,

Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
(1969).
Cal. App.2d - , - , 79 Cal.
437 (1969).

18.
Rptr.
19.
Rptr.

274
433,
275
657
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his attorney before taking the test, and his insistence upon
consulting his attorney before taking it supported the finding
that he refused. The Court stated that substantial evidence
supported the implied finding that the driver was not misled
by an earlier Miranda warning. Apparently, the driver hurt
himself when he testified:
You hear so much scuttle-butt . . . about the effects
of all those tests . . . so I just didn't know which one
. that's why I wanted the advice of an
to take.
attorney.
The trial court, it was reasoned, could conclude that the
confusion was independently arrived at and was not the result
of the statements by the arresting officer.
In West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 the Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court on the Rust issue.
The Court of Appeal determined that where the arrested person is confused and where his response to questions asked
him concerning his willingness to take the test indicates that
he is asserting a right that he has been told he has as the result
of the Miranda warning, it is incumbent on the officer to
make an explanation. West is interesting because on September 26, 1969, the court modified its opinion to indicate that
the confusion of the driver should have been apparent to the
arresting officer. The court stated originally:
Thus, it is necessary to send the case back to the trial
court to make a finding as to whether or not the record
does, in fact, show confusion on the part of the respondent. I
This sentence was modified as the result of the order of
September 26, 1969, to provide an addition, so that the sentence now reads:
Thus, it is necessary to send the case back to the trial
court to make a finding as to whether or not the record
20. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (1969); modified 1 Cal. App.
3d 1049a.
CAL LAW 1970
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does, in fact, show confusion on the part of the respondent which should have been apparent to the arresting officers. (Emphasis added.)2
In Lacy v. Orr,3 the peace officer told the driver he had a
right to the presence of a lawyer while being questioned, and
subsequently advised the driver of the requirements of the
Implied Consent Law. The driver said he wanted a lawyer
before submitting to the test. The reviewing Court affirmed
the trial court's judgment denying to the driver a writ of mandate. The reviewing Court distinguished Rust, saying that
the Miranda warning in Rust stated the driver had a right
"beginning at that moment, to an attorney." In addition,
the driver's testimony never indicated he had been confused.
The 1969 cases show that the courts have treated this duty
on the part of the officer to be either absolute, as in Wethern
and Weber, or dependent on the facts, as in Walker, so that if
the trial court determined there was no confusion, the reviewing Courts generally will affirm. The trend of the cases indicates that confusion is not established simply because the
driver refuses to take the test until he talks to his attorney.4
Perhaps, at some time, the State Supreme Court will clarify
this disarray of judicial opinion, and will restore People v.
Ellis to the authoritative position it once held.
The courts have indicated that there is no duty on an officer
to explain to a driver that he has no right to have his own
physician withdraw blood when the test is given. This point
was made clear in Beales v. Department of Motor Vehicles. 5
It was there held that the driver's twice-pronounced statement
that "he would take a blood test on the condition his own physician be permitted to draw the blood" was a refusal within
the contemplation of section 13353 of the Vehicle Code. In
Wegner v. Department of Motor Vehicles,6 the Court reversed
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2. Modified 1 Cal. App.3d 1049a.
3. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr.
276 (1969).
4. See also Ent v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App.2d 936,
71 Cal Rptr. 726 (1968).
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a finding by the trial court that there was no refusal. The
driver refused to take the test, stating that he wanted the test
to be given by his own doctor. The Court ruled that the driver
was neither entitled to have his lawyer present, nor entitled
to have his own doctor perform the test. The driver, at the
hearing, maintained that the only reason he wanted his own
doctor was because the technician summoned to take the blood
test had dirty fingernails, and he feared infection. The Court,
on appeal, took the position that if there had been objection
to the dirty fingernails of the technician, this should have been
indicated to the peace officer at the time the technician was
summoned. It would have been a simple matter for the driver
to indicate to the technician that his fingernails were dirty.
A related situation arose in Westmoreland v. Chapman,7
where the driver refused to let a technician draw a blood
sample simply because the driver did not like a technician performing this test. The court held that this was a refusal, and
indicated that the driver need not be told that the licensed
technician was authorized by statute to take the blood test.
Where the driver wishes to have his own doctor perform the
blood test, the Vehicle Codes indicates that he may do so,
but that such a test is an additional test. The right to have his
own doctor perform the test is not a right that he can assert
under Vehicle Code section 13353, and whatever other rights
he may have under the Vehicle Code need not be explained
to him in order to make a refusal under section 13353 effective.
On the other hand, where a driver indicates that he is
willing to take anyone of the tests, and his responses indicate
that he wants the peace officer to make the election, there is
no refusal. The Court so held in James v. State of California
ex reI. Department of Motor Vehicles. 9 Among other reasons
given for the Court's conclusion that there was no refusal was
the fact that the statute placed no affirmative duty on the
driver to state which test he would take. This statement is
7. 268 Cal. App.2d 1, 74 Cal. Rptr.
363 (1968).
8. Vehicle Code § 13354.
CAL LAW 1970
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remarkable in that the statute does contemplate that the driver
be given his choice of which test he wishes to take, and the
1969 amendment to section 13353 makes it very clear that
the driver shall be told that he has his choice. It would seem
that if the choice were the driver's, and if he had the duty to
take a test, one could well conclude that he had a duty to
make an election. Whether the same results would obtain
now, under the 1969 legislation, one may only speculate.
Under existing law, the statute requires the driver to be told
that the failure to submit to the test will result in the suspension of his license for six months. In lanusch v. Department
of Motor Vehicles/a the driver was told that he would "probably" have his license suspended by the Department of Motor
Vehicles. It was urged that the use of the word "probably"
vitiated compliance with section 13353. The Court, observing that the uncontradicted evidence in the record showed
that the officer signed the sworn statement indicating that the
failure to submit to the test "will" result in the suspension of
the driver's license privileges, noted that the only evidence
relating to any defect in the warning concerned the use of the
word "probably" by the officer. The Court observed that it
would have been preferable if the exact words of the statute
had been used, but noted that it was probable, but not positive,
that the license would be suspended. Obviously, the use of
the word "probably" did not confuse the driver, and, thus, its
use did not vitiate the warning.
In Lacy v. Orr/ 1 the Court was also faced with the contention that the driver had been denied due process of law
because he was not permitted to secure legal counsel after his
arrest and, therefore, was prevented from extricating himself
from the consequences of his refusal to submit to one of the
tests. The Court, however, indicated that the fact that he was
not permitted to call an attorney until after the booking procedure had ended did not deprive him of any rights with regard
to Vehicle Code section 13353; whatever wrong might have
occurred in withholding permission to make telephone calls
10. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1968).
232
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within the statutory period permitted by the Penal CodeI2
was unrelated to the application of the section involved; that
implied consent problems may be separated from the matters
normally involved in arrest, detention, and acquiring of evidence. I3
In Wegner v. Department of Motor Vehicles,14 the driver,
after refusing to take the test and upon his release from the
police station, secured his own blood test and gave the results
to the district attorney. The Court held that such an attempt
did not overcome the effects of the refusal. Is
The Court, in Fankhauser v. Orr/ 6 reversed the judgment
of the trial court that had granted a writ of mandate predicated
on the assertion that the driver was too drunk to have refused. I7 In addition, Fankhauser determined the role the
officer's sworn statement should play in informal proceedings
held before the department pursuant to section 13353.
Vehicle Code section 14104, relating to this type of informal
hearing, admits evidence of this nature. IS
In Noll v. Department of Motor Vehicles/ 9 the Court explained subdivision (c) of Vehicle Code section 13353, with
respect to the effect of a request for a continuance by the
driver. The Court pointed out that where a hearing was
scheduled within 15 days of a request by the driver, any re12. Penal Code § 851.5.
13. People v. Wren, 271 Cal. App.
2d 788, 76 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1969);
People v. Fite, 267 Cal. App.2d 685,
73 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1968); People v.
Hanggi, 265 Cal. App.2d Supp. 969,
70 Cal. Rptr. 540, 73 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1968).
14. 271 Cal. App.2d 838, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 920 (1969).
15. The results here were fairly well
forecast in Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal
App.2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. III (1968).
See also Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 333-334.
16. 268 Cal. App.2d 418, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 61 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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17. The court relied on Bush v.
Bright, 264 Cal. App.2d 788, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 123 (1968).
18. In its analysis of the problem,
the court did a far better job of explaining the admissibility of the sworn
statement than did the court in Fallis
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264
Cal. App.2d 373, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595
(1968) and this is probably one of the
better cases in explaining the force of
that code section as well as Vehicle
Code § 14108, relating to evidence to
be considered by the department.
19. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1969).
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quest for a hearing extending the time beyond the 15 days
would cause any stay of the department's order of license
suspension to be lifted. However, the section would not require the termination of the stay pending completion of a
hearing that the department had to afford, when the delay is
occasioned by the failure of the department's witness to produce documents that are material to his testimony. In Noll,
the driver contended that the peace officer had a very poor
memory, and if the officer had brought his documents, more
would have been established on cross-examination. The
Court noted that discovery was available to the driver and
that if the reports of the policeman were so important, they
should have been secured by the driver. Since he did not,
their absence is unexplained, and the Court will assume that
the report was wilfully suppressed.
In Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles,20 the Court
pointed out that there was no exception to the automatic
suspension where driving was necessary in employment or
earning a livelihood. 1

III. Procedure at Administrative Hearings
A. Tn General
During 1969, a number of cases were decided relating to
( 1) jurisdiction of administrative agencies to hold hearings,
(2) burden of proof, (3) application of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 2 (4) res judicata, and (5) quasi-legislative
hearings.
B. Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies

1. To Reach Former Employees
In Cal-Pacific Collection, Inc. v. Powers,3 the California
Supreme Court discussed the jurisdiction of the Department
20. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 657 (1969).
1. Vehicle Code § 13210 does not
apply.
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3. 70 Ca1.2d 135, 74 Cal. Rptr. 289,
449 P.2d 225 (1969).
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of Professional and Vocational Standards to proceed against
a licensee of a Collection Agency Licensing Bureau, as well
as the individual plaintiffs employed by the collection agency
in various capacities. The question arose because of an attempt by the licensing agency to institute and take disciplinary
action against these individual employees and Cal-Pacific,
although Cal-Pacific had surrendered its license prior to the
time that disciplinary action had been instituted. During
the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the qualification certificate issued to Cal-Pacific's secretary was revoked
by operation of law for nonpayment of fees. Cal-Pacific
contended that the acceptance by the licensing agency of the
voluntary surrender of the license deprived the agency of jurisdiction to proceed against it. The licensing agency in the
proceeding relied upon Business and Professions Code section
6949.1, stating in part:
The voluntary surrender of a license . . . shall not
deprive the Director of jurisdiction to proceed with
any
disciplinary proceeding against such license. . . .
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in determining that
pursuant to the plain reading of the language of the statute,
the licensing agency was not deprived of jurisdiction by the
voluntary surrender. Moreover, the power of the agency to
take disciplinary action was not limited in any way to proceedings already pending at the time of the surrender by
Cal-Pacific. The Court so held in the face of Cal-Pacific's
contention that pursuant to section 6949 of the Business and
Professions Code, under which it purportedly surrendered
its license, such a surrender could be made only "so long
as no disciplinary action is then pending against said licensee.
. . ." As between these two sections, 6949 and 6949.1, the
latter was held by the Court to rule; otherwise, its enactment
would have been simply a useless gesture.
With regard to the individual who held only a qualification certificate, no section such as 6949.1 of the Business
and Professions Code was applicable. The individual cerCAL LAW 1970
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tificate-holders had to rely upon Business and Professions
Code section 118, applicable to all statewide agencies within
the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards,
which provided in part in subdivision (b) :
The . . . exception, or forfeiture by operation of
law of the license issued by the board in the department . . . shall not, during any period in which it
may be renewed, restored, reissued or reinstated, deprive
the board of its ability to institute or continue a disciplinary proceeding against a licensee upon any ground
provided by law or to enter an order suspending or revoking a license or otherwise taking disciplinary action
against a licensee on any such ground. . . .
The case also dealt with three employees of Cal-Pacific.
They held no license or certificate, and had terminated their
employment with Cal-Pacific prior to the institution of the
disciplinary action seeking to disqualify them from holding
any office or employment in the collection agency business.
Section 6930 of the Business and Professions Code then in
effect authorized the director, upon finding a violation by an
"employee" of a licensee, to order the "employee" disqualified
from further employment in the collection agency business.
After the institution of the proceedings, the word "employee," as found in section 6930 of the Business and Professions Code, was changed to read "person." With the change,
the Court noted that the director was authorized to institute
proceedings of disqualification after the employee had terminated his employment, but the Court was unable to find any
statutory provisions that would have authorized such proceedings at the time the matter was instituted. As to the
former employees at the time the action was instituted, the
director had no jurisdiction to proceed to disqualification.
Cal-Pacific is one of the more recent cases in California
dealing with the ability of the licensing agency to proceed
against persons who at one time or another had been under
the control of the agency and who, by one means or another,
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9
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attempt to remove themselves voluntarily from its contro],4
2. To Impose Conditions
Related to the question of jurisdiction is the question of
what happens when the agency attempts to extract from someone dealing with it a condition that is beyond the statutory
authority of the administrative agency.
In Worthington v. State Board of Control,5 an employee
of the State Board of Control obtained a release from a claimant seeking compensation under the provisions of Government
Code sections 13970-13973, which compensate private
citizens injured while preventing a crime. The release purported to extinguish all claims against the state relating to the
subject matter of the claim. The Court considered the release totally ineffective. The program of indemnity under
which the claimant sought benefits existed only by reason of
the statute. The procedure was prescribed by the State Board
of Control. Neither the statute nor the rules refer to any
requirement of a release before payment could be made.
When the legislature acted on the Board of Control's recommendation calling for payment of a portion of the applicant's
4. For agencies within the Department of Professional and Vocational
Standards, the reader should review
the provisions of Business and Professions Code § 118. Where the agency
is not within the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards,
and there is no other code section
relating ot the effect of withdrawal of
an application for licensure or an attempted surrender of a license, the
reader may find some enlightenment
in cases such as Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1, 80 L.Ed. 1015, 56 S.C!. 654
(1935) and Miller v. Board of Police
Commissioners, 181 Cal. App.2d 562,
5 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960), holding that
a withdrawal of an application, absent
a statute to the contrary, deprives the
agency of jurisdiction to continue to
CAL LAW 1970
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hear the case. On the other hand,
once a license is issued, the licensee
has submitted himself to the control
of the agency, and an attempted surrender of the license, absent a statute
to the contrary, will not deprive the
agency of power to proceed with the
hearing and make a decision. Albert
Albek, Inc. v. Brock, 75 Cal. App.2d
173, 170 P.2d 508 (1946) cf. Grand
v. Griesinger, 160 Cal. App.2d 307,
325 P.2d 475 (1958). If, however, the
license has expired, absent a statute
to the contrary, an agency may not
institute proceedings against the former
licensee.
O'Neil v. Department of
Professional & Vocational Standards,
7 Cal. App.2d 395, 46 P.2d 234 (1935).
S. 266 Cal. App.2d 697, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 449 (1968).
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claim, once this determination was made, the role of the staff
of the Board of Control was only ministerial, i.e., to see to the
drawing of the funds and transmittal of them to the claimant. The act of the zealous employee, in seeking to hold the
legislative appropriation for ransom until the applicant signed
the general release, was said by the Court to be without authority. The release was an unlawful condition to payment.
It was of no effect and its existence provided no defense to
the mandamus proceeding brought by the petitioner.
3. Exercise of Jurisdiction Without a Hearing
The courts also had before them the question of what types
of hearings an administrative agency could be required to give.
In Orr v. Superior Court,6 the State Supreme Court reviewed
the provisions of the Financial Responsibility Law7 contained
in the Vehicle Code, and determined that where a driver was
involved in an accident, before he would be required to show
ability to respond in damages as a condition of retaining his
driving privileges, the Department of Motor Vehicles would
have to review the material before it to determine whether
there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be
recovered against the driver. The Court indicated that the
determination of the department could be made from accident
reports that the drivers are obligated to make pursuant to
Vehicle Code section 16000, and from other evidence submitted to the department. This did not require the department to hold a hearing and the department, in making its
determination, was not required to decide whether the driver
was at fault; rather, it was to make a determination whether
there was any credible evidence under which the driver could
reasonably be considered culpable.
An administrative proceeding that results in a municipal
employee being suspended from his employment without
a prior hearing was upheld in Aposto!i v. City and County
of San Francisco. 8 In Aposto/i, the applicable provisions
6. 71 Cal.2d - , 77 Cal. Rptr. 816,
454 P .2d 712 (1969).
7. Vehicle Code §§ 16000 et seq.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

238

8. 268 Cal. App.2d 728, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 435 (1969).
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provided for a full hearing on appeal to a higher commission,
with right to a public trial and power to secure the attendance
of witnesses. While a fair hearing implies adequacy of notice,
the Court also determined that where the petitioner (1) had
received information from his order of discharge that action
was being taken against him and (2) had been given a copy
of the investigation report making him fully aware of the reasons for his suspension, he could not successfully contend that
he did not have adequate notice, or that the order of discharge
was defective in omitting the section of the agency's regulation that it was charged he violated.
4. To Reverse Former Decisions
In Eastham v. Santa Clara Elementary School District,9 the
Court had before it the question of whether an administrative
agency, having once acted, has authority to reverse its prior
determination. In Eastham, a school district had determined
the starting salary for employees of the school district, establishing a kind of parity among certain classes of employees.
Later, the district changed its salary policy. The contention
was made that where the board had once adopted this policy,
it could not change it. The claim was made that the board
had exhausted its power over the subject matter, and had no
further continuing jurisdiction. The Court determined that
the fact that the district had for some time established the
same salary schedule for nurses and teachers did not mean
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable to change that policy.
The Court discerned differences between teachers and nurses,
and further found evidence to support the board's determination that different levels of competitive salary had evolved for
the two positions. The Court, rather than being bound by
the theory that there had been a prior decision that the board
was powerless to change because it had exhausted its jurisdiction over the subject matter, relied instead on the idea that
there was nothing that compelled the district to treat nurses
and teachers the same forever. The board has the power to
9. 270 Cal. App.2d 807. 76 Cal.
Rptr. 198 (1969).
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change its salary policy and to classify its employees, even
those with tenure, differently, according to training, experience, and duties.

C. Burden of Proof
While, generally, it may be assumed that where an administrative agency seeks to discipline an existing licensee, the
burden of proof is on the administrative agency,10 there are
cases where this may not be true. Among these is the case
where a taxpayer attacks an assessment made on his property
by an assessor. In proceedings before the local administrative agency, the taxpayer has the burden of showing that
the assessor's figures are improper. In Griffith v. County of
Los Angeles,ll the Court held that it was presumed that the
assessor's actions were proper, and the taxpayer had the
burden.

D. Application of the Administrative Procedure Act
In Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends and
Developments 1969, p. 337, it was noted that a person who
conducts an administrative hearing need be a lawyer only
if the law requires it. Serenko v. Bright12 held that in formal
hearings before the Department of Motor Vehicles, the
referees conducting the proceedings for the department need
not be persons possessing the same qualifications as those required of hearing officers conducting proceedings normally
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 13 During 1969, this
point was reaffirmed in several cases. 14

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

10. Val Strough Chevrolet v. Bright,
269 Cal. App.2d 855, 75 Cal. Rptr.
363 (1969).
11. 267 Cal. App.2d 837, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 773 (1969).
12. 263 Cal. App.2d 682, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1969).
13. Govt. Code §§ 11500 et seq.
See also Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1969, p. 337.
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14. See the cases Lacy v. Orr, 276
Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1969); Walker v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal. App.2d - ,
79 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1969); Noll v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal.
App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1969);
Reirdon v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 266 Cal. App.2d 808, 76
Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969).
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It was argued in Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior
Court/ 5 that section 14107 of the Vehicle Code, merely indicates who is to conduct a formal hearing, not who is to
preside. The Court rejected this contention. The Court
determined that section 14107 indicates that the hearing may
be conducted by a referee appointed from officers or employees
of the department. If it is borne in mind that a referee is one
who is appointed to take testimony, hear the parties, and report findings, section 14107 could hardly be used to support
the contention that there was a distinction between conducting and presiding over hearings. The provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act will govern the actions of an
administrative agency only to the extent that the law relating
to that particular function of the agency makes the Administrative Procedure Act applicable. Where the sections dealing
with the particular function of the agency carve out some
other pattern or rule, to that extent, the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply.16

E. Res Judicata
In Petry v. Board of Retirement/7 the Court held that a
decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to
the effect that an injury arose out of and occurred in the course
of employment, was not res judicata in proceedings before
the Retirement Board of the County of Los Angeles. The
Court reasoned that the retirement board had valid and independent rights with respect to determining whether the employee had suffered injury in the course and scope of his employment. ls Whatever the validity of this contention, the result
seems inconsistent with that reached in Pathe v. City of
15. 271 Cal. App.2d 770, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 804 (1969).
16. See also Hough v. McCarthy,
54 Ca1.2d 273, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668, 353
P.2d 276 (1960); Fankhauser v. Orr,
268 Cal. App.2d 418, 74 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1968) and August v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App.2d 52,
70 Cal. Rptr 172 (1968).
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17. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 77 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (1969).
18. The court relied upon Flaherty
v. Board of Retirement, 198 Cal. App.
2d 397, 18 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1961) and
Grant v. Board of Retirement, 253 Cal.
App.2d 1020, 61 Cal. Rptr 791 (1967).
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Bakersfield/9 which held that a decision of the Industrial Ac-

cident Commission was binding upon a local pension board. 20
It seems odd to indicate that a pension board such as the one
in Pathe does not have the same rights and responsibilities
as the retirement board in Petry.

F. Quasi-Legislative Hearings
In California Grape etc. League v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 1 the Court had before it the question concerning the
kind of hearing required when an agency is adopting rules and
regulations. The Court determined that proceedings for the
adoption of rules are quasi-legislative in character, and a
hearing of a judicial type is not required. 2 The commission
was not required to make specific proposals before or at public hearings, so that those persons at the hearing who were,
perhaps, at odds with the ultimate determination of the commission, were not entitled to have notice or information as to
what specific proposals might be proposed. The statute did
not require such proposals. 3 The commission did not err in
failing to make available at hearings experts and staff of the
commission who had prepared and compiled statistical studies,
surveys, and other data considered by the commission, or to
place in evidence and allow cross-examination with respect to
any of the studies, surveys, and data. Apparently, the conten19. 255 Cal. App.2d 409, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (1967).
20. See French v. Rissel, 40 Cal.2d
477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953); Gale v. State
Board of Equalization, 264 Cal. App.
2d 689, 70 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1968) and
Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law
-Trends and Developments 1969, p.
321.
1. 268 Cal. App.2d 692, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 313 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
2. The court followed Rivera v.
Division of Industrial Welfare, 265
Cal. App.2d 576, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1968). See also Manuel, ADMIN IS-
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TRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends and
Developments 1969, p. 315.
3. The court noted the provisions of
Government Code § 11425 relating to
the requirements for quasi-legislative
exercise of power and providing that
on the date and at the time designated
in the notice the state agency shall
afford any interested person or his duly
authorized representative or both an
opportunity to present statements,
arguments, or contentions in writing,
with or without opportunity to present
the same orally. Impliedly, the decision determined that § 11425 did not
require anything approaching a quasijudicial hearing.
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tion had been made that various studies should have been introduced and subject to attack and that the people who prepared them should have been subject to cross-examination. 4

IV. Judicial Review
A. Limitation on Court Review
Cases decided in 1969 have again emphasized some limits
on the jurisdiction of courts to review acts of administrative
agencIes.
1. Legislative Limitations
a. Alcoholic Beverage Control Review
An example of legislative limitations placed on court review
of decisions of administrative agencies is noticeable in the field
of alcoholic beverage control. In order to overcome the inordinate amount of time it takes to have decisions of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control become final, the
legislature, in 1967, adopted a more speedy procedure. 5 History had indicated that while it took some time for the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board to decide cases, there
were some unexplainable delays occurring in the Superior
Courts.s The legislature decided to eliminate the Superior
Court from the review process, and, in 1967, enacted section
23090.5 of the Business and Professions Code providing:
4. See Ray v. Parker 15 Cal.2d 275,
101 P.2d 665 (1940) and Olive Proration etc. Committee v. Agriculture etc.
Committee, 17 Cal.2d 204, 109 P.2d
918 (1941). The court indicated that
statutes involved in those cases may
have imposed more rigid standards and
requirements than those found in
§ 11425 of the Government Code and
the applicable Labor Code provisions.
Accordingly, cases that seemed to indicate that there are more stringent
requirements for quasi-legislative hearings should be considered in light of
CAL LAW 1970
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the statutes involved. Otherwise, the
courts may adopt the attitude, as did
the court in the instant case, that they
have no authoritative bearing on review of quasi-legislative type hearings.
5. Stats. 1967, Ch. 1525, amending
Business and Professions Code §§
23090 et seq.

6. Report on Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, Assembly Interim Committee on Governmental Organization,
1961-1963, Volume 12, No.7 (January 1963), pp. 7-11.
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No court of this state except the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeal to the extent specified in this article
shall have jurisdiction to review, affirm, reverse, correct,
or annul any order, rule or decision of the department or
to suspend, stay or delay the operation or execution thereof or to restrain, enjoin or interfere with the department
in the performance of its duties, but a writ of mandate
shall lie from the Supreme Court or the courts of appeal
in any proper case.
In Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Superior
Courf and Kirby v. Superior Court and Gil Mar Club, Inc}
the Court of Appeals ruled that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control in a proceeding instituted after the effective
date of the changes divesting the Superior Court of such jurisdiction.
In the first of these cases,9 the Court of Appeals noted the
similarity of sections of the Business and Professions Code1o
to sections of the Labor Code,11 relating to judicial review of
decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
These sections provide that review must be sought in the reviewing court within 30 days after the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board filed its final order. Since the petitioners failed to seek review within the time specified, the
Court held that the decision of the department must stand,
and, by virtue of Business and Professions Code section
23090.5, that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to
entertain or to stay the enforcement of the suspension order,
regardless of the merits. The procedure now provided for by
Business and Professions Code section 23090.5 contemplates
that decisions of the department or of the Alcoholic Beverage

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

7. 268 Cal. App.2d 67, 73 Cal. Rptr.
780 (1968).
8. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
381 (1969); see also Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Superior
Court, 268 Cal. App.2d 7, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 671 (1968).
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9. 268 Cal. App.2d 67, 73 Cal. Rptr.
780 (1968).
10. Bus. and Prof. Code, §§ 23089
and 23090.
11. Lab. Code §§ 5810 and 5950.
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Control Appeals Board will be reviewed pursuant to writs of
review.
It had been contended that the 1967 amendment to the
Business and Professions Code 12 unconstitutionally divested
the Superior Courts of jurisdiction granted to them by the
state Constitution. 13 These decisions upheld the power of the
legislature to limit review to the courts named in the act, and
held that the Superior Courts could be constitutionally divested of jurisdiction. There was no undue impairment of the
rights of the aggrieved party to obtain judicial relief, because
the Superior Court really had exercised no greater power than
the reviewing court. Since all the courts in the chain of review
can use only the substantial evidence rule to determine if the
findings of the department are supported by the evidence, the
petitioner lost no real right.
The 1967 amendment took effect on November 8, 1967,
and it made no difference when the acts of the petitioners were
alleged to have happened; the decisive time was when the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board filed its final decision. It was at this time that the right to judicial review
matured. The amendments then in effect governed the matter.
In spite of this case, some Superior Courts were unwilling
to deny jurisdiction. In the second case, Kirby v. Superior
Court and Gil Mar Club, Inc./ 4 the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, through its director, was forced to seek a
petition for writ of prohibition. Based on the prior case, the
Court of Appeals had no difficulty sustaining the position of
12. Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 23090
et seq.
13. California Constitution, Article
VI, § 10 reads as follows:
The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges
have original jurisdiction in habeas
corpus proceedings. Those courts also
have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the
nature of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition.
CAL LAW 1970
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Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all causes except those given
by statute to other trial courts.
The Court may make such comment
on the evidence and the testimony and
credibility of any witness as in the
opInIOn is necessary for the proper
determination of the cause. (Added
Nov. 8, 1966.)
14. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal
Rptr. 381 (1969).

245

23

Cal Law Trends
and Developments,
Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 9
Administrative
Law

the department and reaffirmed the constitutionality of section
23090.5; the state Supreme Court denied hearing.
b. Public Utilities Commission Review
Another limitation on the Superior Courts that prohibits interference with decisions of administrative agencies is seen in
Hickey v. Roby.15 The Superior Court set aside a permanent
injunction that purported to enjoin a water company and some
of its officers from transferring, cancelling, or reversing stock
ownership on the water company's books without consent of
the appellant. The Public Utilities Commission intervened in
the Superior Court action and moved to set aside the injunction, contending, among other things, that there were outstanding final decisions of the Public Utilities Commission
that bore on the question of whether the injunction should
have issued. The implied finding of the trial court was that
the injunction would have interfered with the commission in
the performance of its duties in contravention of Public Utilities Code section 1759. The Court of Appeals held that each
of the decisions of the commission relied on was a final order
at the time of the Superior Court action, and was thus conclusive and binding upon the parties. No order of the commission is subject to review in any court of the state except the
state Supreme Court, and even if an order of the commission
is palpably erroneous in law, it is binding and conclusive on
all courts of the state until annulled by the state Supreme
Court. 16 If the commission acts after the Superior Court has
assumed jurisdiction to determine the rights of parties, a later
decision by the commission, made within its jurisdiction, will
have the effect of superseding any prior judgment of the Superior Court. In Hickey, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction, by virtue of the Public Utilities Code,17 to issue the injunction. It was contended by the appellant that by
intervening, the commission had estopped itself to deny jurisdiction of the Superior Court. However, the Court of Appeals
15. 273 Cal. App.2d - , Rptr. - (1969).
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16. See, for instance Pub. UtiI. Code
1759.
17. Pub. UtiI. Code § 1759.
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found this contention had no merit. Although the appellant
was not a party before the Public Utilities Commission in the
decision that had then become final, this fact still did not empower the Superior Court to negate a decision of the commission made within the commission's jurisdiction. The appellant's remedy was to appeal to the commission, not the
Superior Court.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Among the limitations on Superior Court jurisdiction established by case law is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Noonan v. Green/ 8 the Court reaffirmed the
vitality of the doctrine, which provides that where an administrative remedy is available, a party seeking judicial review
must first exhaust that remedy.
. Where in an administrative proceeding there
is an administrative appellate body provided by statute,
that body must exercise its jurisdiction before the courts
may be called upon to act, and the parties to an administrative proceeding may not waive the benefits of the
statute established for public reasons, nor may jurisdiction be conferred upon a court by consenes
Thus, the Court recognized that exhaustion of administrative remedies goes to the very jurisdiction of the court, and
until the remedies are exhausted, a court can have no jurisdiction over the subject matter. 20
In Reimel v. House/ the decision of the Court notes that
18. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 513 (1969).
19. 276 Cal. App.2d - , - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 513, 517.
20. Abelleira v. District Court of
Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942,
132 A.L.R. 715 (1941). Thus, it was
error for the superior court to assume
jurisdiction in a controversy between a
school district and pupil concerning the
suspension of the pupil for refusing to
wear the uniform prescribed by the
CAL LAW 1970
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school where there was an administrative remedy available to review the suspension. The doctrine was held applicable even in the face of the contention by the appellant that the requirement that she wear a certain uniform was unconstitutional.
United
States v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.2d
189, 120 P.2d 26 (1941); Walker v.
Munro, 178 Cal. App.2d 67, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 737 (1960).
1. 268 Cal. App.2d 780, 74 Cal.
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while on review a licensee objected to the use of a deposition.
At the time of the hearing before the administrative agency,
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, no objection
was made on any ground urged on appeal. The Court stated
that an issue not raised before the trier of fact could not ordinarily be raised for the first time on appellate review, and this
meant that it could not be raised for the first time before
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board. Moreover,
the Court noted that decisions of the department could not be
defeated for mere error unless the reviewing tribunal, after
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, should
be of the opinion that the error complained of had resulted in
a miscarriage of justice. 2
C. Non-reviewable Administrative Action
In Jones v. Oxnard School District,3 Sadie Jones applied for
employment with the Oxnard School District. The school
district and State Board of Education denied her application.
On appeal, a dismissal, after a general demurrer to the complaint, was affirmed.
The amended complaint before the reviewing court alleged
that the appellant was a qualified elementary school teacher
and the holder of a general elementary teaching credential.
She had registered her credential with the particular county
superintendent of schools and applied for a teaching position
in the Oxnard School District. She further alleged that the
district employed a number of elementary school teachers who
were not duly certificated and that such employment was in
violation of the law, which provides for the hiring of noncertificated teachers only on applications accompanied by a
statement of need indicating that there are no qualified regularly certificated applicants for the positions available. The
Rptr. 345 (1969). See Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends
and Developments 1969, pp. 316, 342.
2. California Constitution, Article
VI, § 13. See also Ward v. County
of Riverside, 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78
Cal. Rptr. 46 (1969).
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3. 270 Cal. App.2d 587, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 836 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
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Court determined that the appellant's argument called for judicial review of a nonreviewable administrative action.
The appellant did not attack the propriety of the action of
the State Board of Education in issuing the provisional credentials that permitted other persons to be employed in the position sought by her. She had elected not to make the state
board a party to the action. Her attack was directed against
the action of the local district that led to the ultimate decision
of the state board.
The Court noted that the attack that she made could succeed only if she alleged either that the district refused to exercise its discretion or that it failed to act as enjoined by law,
but that neither situation was present in the case. Since traditional mandate under Civil Procedure Code section 1085
was inapplicable, the Court reasoned that administrative mandamus under Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5 was not
applicable. The action of filing the certificate of need was
not within the definition of a quasi-judicial activity so as to
be within the ambit of the latter section. It simply was a preliminary step by one body enabling another to act. The Court
stated that since no vested procedural or substantive right of
the appellant's employment was involved, due process did not
require a method of judicial review to be formulated where
none was provided by the statute.
In Worthington v. State Board of Control,4 the court held
that the role of the State Board of Control in drawing and
transmitting funds appropriated by the legislature to compensate private citizens for personal injury incurred while trying
to prevent a crime is only a ministerial act. The board, at its
discretion, may compensate such injured persons. The Court
indicated that the statute 5 involved merely created a procedure
through which claims for indemnity could be received and
evaluated by the board of control. Under the statute, the
board then makes recommendations to the legislature for appropriation. If a claimant is not satisfied with the board of
control's compensation recommendation, his remedy is to ap4. 266 Cal. App.2d 697, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 449 (1968).
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proach his legislative representative and seek hearings before
the appropriate subcommittee of the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. In turn,
the legislature is free to reduce, increase, or totally reject the
board's recommendations. The board of control acts only
in an advisory capacity, and any dissatisfaction with the
procedures followed by the board, the rules adopted by
it, or the advice it gives to the legislature, must be pursued
through exclusively legislative means. There is no judicial
review.
Another example of nonreviewable administrative action
stems from the general rule that where an officer is vested with
discretionary power, a court cannot control this discretion.
Accordingly, mandamus will not lie to compel the district attorney to prosecute a charge of perjury where his duties in
this respect are discretionary and not mandatory. This was
the holding in Ascherman v. Bales,6 although Government
Code section 26501 provided that the district attorney shall
institute proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably suspected of public offenses,
when he has information that such offenses have been committed. Although the statute uses the word "shall," the context of the word in the statute indicates that the duty contemplated by the legislature was discretionary.
Although mandamus will not lie to control discretion, it
was held in Priest v. Housing Authoriti that where the exercise of discretion necessarily involves the interpretation of
a statute, courts could entertain the action to determine if
the interpretation of the statute was correct. In Priest, the
trial court found that mandamus could not be used to control
a discretionary act, and that the respondent therein had exercised its discretionary power in deciding that a contract did
not come within the purview of a statute involved. The reviewing court, on the other hand, took the position that interpretation or construction of a statute is a matter of law, not
the exercise of discretionary authority, and that mandamus
6. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
445 (1969).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9 250
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Rptr. 145 (1969).
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was a proper remedy to correct a misinterpretation of a statute. s
D. Standing To Institute Proceedings

The question of who may bring an action to review an
administrative action was touched on in California School Employees Association v. Sequoia etc. School District,9 holding
that the association had standing to sue in its own name to enforce the employment rights of its members. The issue before
the Court was whether a food service program, by which a
nongovernmental concern was granted a concession to provide
vending machines, violated the rights of school cafeteria employees. The concession agreement resulted in the termination of their employment. The Court held that the association
had a justifiable public interest in the case.
The Court also recognized that the association had such a
stake in the outcome as to assure the kind of adverseness that
would sharpen the issues. 1o
InAmerican Federation of Teachers, Local 1713, AFL8. Likewise, in Proctor v. San
Francisco Port Authority, 266 Cal.
App.2d 675, 72 Cal Rptr. 248 (1968),
the adoption by the Port Authority of
salary ranges for its employees in
excess of the powers granted to it by
the Harbors and Navigation Code,
could be reviewed by the court and
declared invalid, and once the court
declared the new salary ranges invalid,
the court could order payment to the
employees under salary ranges that
existed prior to the adoption of the
void range. However, in Lawe v.
EI Monte School District of Los
Angeles, 267 Cal. App.2d 20, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 554 (1968), it will be noted that
where the governing board of a school
district has the power to fix and order
compensation, the court will accord to
the board a great deal of leeway and
respect, leaving it to the governing
CAL LAW 1970
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board, for example, to determine the
extent to which it will give credit for
teaching experience outside the district.
The court will not interfere with its
determination in this respect if the
policy is reasonable in nature, fairly
applied without discrimination.
9. 272 Cal. App.2d 98, 77 Cal. Rptr.
187 (1969).
10. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.2d 276,
32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963);
International Association of Fire
Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60 Cal.2d
295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 384 P.2d 170
(1963) . The court having determined
that the association had standing, it was
not necessary to determine whether the
association had an alternative right to
maintain the action, as a taxpayers'
suit to enjoin an illegal expenditure.
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CIO v. San Leandro Unified School District,ll the American
Federation of Teachers was held to have had no standing to
seek a writ of mandate directing the school district to employ
a probationary teacher. The decision not to employ the probationary teacher was arrived at after a hearing held pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act. 12 All that was involved
were the rights of the employee. Since no interest or right of
the union was invaded, no relief could be granted to the union.
The union was not a proper party and could not state a cause
of action. 13 While the reasons given in the case appear to be
valid, it should be noted that traditionally where there has
been an administrative hearing of an adjudicatory nature,
standing to seek judicial review has been limited to those persons who were parties before the administrative agency.14

E. Other Equitable Considerations
The equitable nature of mandamus was amplified in Genser
v. McElvy/5 wherein the petitioner sought to compel the state
architect to revoke his approval of a change order providing
for the substitution of plastic pipe for metal pipe. However,
the Court noted that this proceeding was really moot, and
mandamus would not lie where the plastic pipe had been installed and encased in the walls and floors before a school
district was joined as an indispensable party. The Court
noted that although mandamus is generally classed as a legal
remedy, the question of whether it should be applied is controlled by equitable considerations.
11. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (1969).
12. Govt. Code §§ 11500 et seq.
13. Hence, the court held that cases
such as International Association of
Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60
Cal.2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 384
P.2d 170 (1963) and International Association of Fire Fighters v. County
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of Merced, 204 Cal. App.2d 387, 22
Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962) were inapplicable.
14. Madruga v. Borden, 63 Cal.
App.2d 116, 146 P.2d 273 (1944); 2
Cal. Jur.2d ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 209, p. 343.
15. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 82 Cal.
Rptr. 420, 82 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1969).
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V. Scope of Review
A. In General
Traditionally, adjudicatory decisions of local and state-wide
agencies given adjudicatory powers by the state constitution
are reviewed by the substantial evidence rule. 16
B. Constitutionally Created Agencies
In County of Los Angeles v. Tax Appeals Board No.2 for
the County of Los Angeles, 17 the Court, discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, asked the
question whether an agency exercises an adjudicatory function in considering facts presented at a hearing. The Court
noted that where a party has a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the administrative proceedings, and has the
right to appear, he may properly institute proceedings for
mandamus. One of the universally recognized results of the
substantial evidence rule, where mandamus is sought to review
the decision of a local agency, is that the court has no power
to conduct a trial de novo and substitute its findings on matters
within the jurisdiction of the local board. In the instant case,
the board was created under the authority of California Constitution, Article XIII, section 9.5. The Court concluded that
where there was no evidence to support the findings of the administrative agency, the action of the agency could not stand,
and the Superior Court acted properly in remanding the proceedings to the board and commanding the board to set aside
its decision and to conduct further hearings.
In Petry v. Board of Retirement of the Los Angeles County
Employees Retirement Association,18 the Court again dealt
with a local agency and determined that in reviewing a board
decision neither the Superior Court nor a reviewing court
could reweigh the evidence. A reviewing court, in applying
16. Some of the more fundamental
notions in this regard were commented
upon in Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.
Cal Law-Trends and Developments
1969, p. 310.
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Cal. App.2d 830, 73 Cal.
(1968).
Cal. App.2d - , 77 Cal.
(1969).
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the substantial evidence rule when reviewing a decision of a
local agency, applies the same standard as is applicable to a
review of trial court findings. That is, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the, decision, and all reasonable inferences will be applied in support of the decision.
So well-established is the rule and so easy is itto understand,
that one is amazed that the trial courts are still having problems. In Upton v. Gray/9 the trial court, in dealing with a
decision of a local administrative agency, accepted new evidence on and decided anew, an issue previously decided by
the agency. This action on the part of the trial court was
held error by the Court of Appeals. When the subject und~r
review is a decision of a local or county administrative agency
that by law is required to hold a hearing, the power of the court
is strictly limited, and it may not exercise its independent judgment or allow a trial de novo on fact issues formally before the
agency. The Court noted that review is limited to a determination of whether the agency, based on the evidence before it,
abused its discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The Superior Court cannot reweigh the evidence. While
the reviewing court dwelt on the nature of the agency in determining that the trial court acted improperly in accepting
new evidence, it followed a line of cases previously decided. 20
The Court might have simply resolved this issue on the basis
of subdivision (e) of the Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5. Barkin v. Board of Optometry/ establishes that the
limitations therein provided are applicable whether the substantial evidence rule is followed or the court is given the right
to conduct a so-called limited trial de novo under the Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5. 2
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 352, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 783 (1969).
20. For example, Beverly HiIIs Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Superior Court, 259 Cal. App.2d 306,
66 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1968).
1. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969).
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2. Other cases decided reaffirming
that the scope of review with respect
to local agencies is the substantial evidence rule, are: Apostoli v. City and
County of San Francisco, 268 Cal.
App.2d 728, 74 Cal. Rptr 435 (1969);
Griffith v. County of Los Angeles, 267
Cal. App.2d 837, 73 Cal. Rptr 773
(1968), cert. den., 395 U.S. 945, 23 L.
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In Ishimatsu v. Board of Regents,S the Court determined
that mandamus was proper to obtain review of a University of
California decision to terminate a librarian's employment (1)
where a hearing was granted (2) evidence was taken and (3)
determinations of fact were vested in the hearing agency. The
Court held that under the state Constitution the university is
a statewide administrative agency possessing adjudicatory
powers. The employee had contended that the Constitution
did not delegate to the university the power to make such an
adjudicatory determination of facts. The reviewing Court
answered that the university was a statewide administrative
agency with powers derived from Article IX, section 9, of the
state Constitution, possessed of full powers of organization
and government, and subject only to such legislative control
as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms of
endowments of the university and the security of its funds.
The Court interpreted Article IX, section 9 of the Constitution
as granting to the university adjudicatory powers with respect
to problems relating to its personnel. The employee attempted to attack the evidence presented, charging it was not
credible or competent. The Court indicated that there may
have been conflicts in the evidence but that these conflicts
were resolved against the employee. Strangely, although the
Court was dealing with what it determined was a constitutional agency, the Court sought refuge in cases standing for
the proposition that where the trial court makes an independent determination on the facts, the reviewing court is bound
by the decision of the trial court, if there is any evidence to
Ed. 463, - S.Ct. -. Griffith indicates
again that the taxpayer must challenge
the determination of the value of his
property for tax purposes, show the
local board that the assessor's figures
are improper and that the assessments
are not fair or equitable. To sustain
his burden, the taxpayer must introduce
some evidence of the assessor's inequity
before any burden is cast on the assessor.
Before the administrative
agency, the assessor can stand on the
CAL LAW 1970
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presumption that his assessment is fair
and equitable. Thus, the taxpayer
must bear in mind, before he seeks
mandamus to review the actions of
the board denying his request for reassessment, that his failure to make
out a prima facie case will make the
respondent local agency's task much
simpler on appeal.
3. 266 Cal. App.2d 854, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 756 (1968).
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support it. 4 The use of those decisions is not consistent with
the application of the substantial evidence test.
The California Constitution, Article XX, section 14 requires the legislature to provide for the maintenance of a State
Board of Health. However, Alta-Dena Dairy v. County of
San Dieg06 held that decision-making power was not granted.
Although the local health officer has certain powers with regard to control of milk, his actions as an agent of a statewide administrative agency could be reviewed by a trial de
novo.
In Gubser v. Department of Employment,6 a discharged
state employee sought review of a decision of the State Personnel Board. That a decision of the State Personnel Board
is reviewable under the substantial evidence rule has long since
been established. 7 Nevertheless, the trial court sought to interfere with the decision of the State Personnel Board without
giving effect to the substantial evidence rule in favor of the
agency's decision. Gubser gives a definition of substantia]
evidence that might be helpful. It defines "substantial evidence" as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, that is, whether
a fair and reasonable mind would accept it as probative of the
issue." The Court further stated:
It matters not that we might have come to a different
conclusion had the decision been ours to make in the first
instance, or that reasonable men might differ, as respondent argues; it is enough that a reasonable mind
could reach the same conclusions as reached by the Appeals [sic] Board. 8
4. The court followed Moran v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.
2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948) and Yakov
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68
Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 435
P.2d 553 (1968).
5. 271 Cal. App.3d 66, 76 Cal. Rptr.
510 (1969). For further discussion of
this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, in this volume.
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6. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1969).
7. Shepherd v. State Personnel
Board, 48 Cal.2d 41, 307 P.2d 4 (1957),
and see Sweeney v. State Personnel
Board, 245 Cal. App.2d 246, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 766 (1966).
8. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, - , 76 Cal.
Rptr. 577, 581 (1969).
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When facts constituting an impairment of First Amendment
rights are uncontradicted, the question is one of law and not
of fact, and thus the state Supreme Court may make an independent examination of the whole record to determine if
there has been an infringement of constitutional rights. In
Los Angeles Teachers' Union v. Los Angeles City Board of
Education,9 the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the
trial court denying a writ of mandate. The lower court had
refused to stop the local board of education from interfering
with the right of the teachers' union to circulate a petition on
noninstruction time. This case is not particularly startling,
for it simply announces the test for appellate review that is
applicable in any situation where there is a claim of violation
of First Amendment rights where First Amendment freedoms
have been involved. This doctrine has already been applied
to the review of a decision of the Public Utilities Commission;
ordinarily, the scope of review of that agency's decisions would
be limited by the substantial evidence rule. tO
C. Legislatively Created Agencies
With respect to legislatively created agencies of the State of
California, the state Supreme Court in Merrill v. Department
of Molar Vehicles, 11 recapitulated the existing rules without
making any new or different application of those rules. The
Court was dealing with a decision of the Department of Motor
Vehicles refusing an application for a motor vehicle dealer's
license.
The controlling statute, Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5,12 does not indicate in what cases the court is authorized
9. 71 Cal.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 723,
455 P.2d 827 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
10. Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
Cal Law-Trends and Developments
1969, p. 310.
11. 71 Cal.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 89,
458 P.2d 33 (1969).
12. The court quotes from Code of
CAL LAW 1970
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Civil Procedure § 1094.5(b) the following:
"The inquiry in such a case [i.e.,
one involving review of an administrative decision by writ of mandate] shall
extend to the questions whether the respondent was [sic] proceeded without,
or in excess of jurisdiction: whether
there was a fair trial; and whether
there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is estab-
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to exercise its independent judgment concerning the evidence.
Such a determination, accomplished by means of judicial decision, depends on whether the right or interest effected by the
administrative decision is a vested one. If the right is vested,
the decision is reviewed by means of a limited trial de novo in
which the court not only examines the record for errors of
law also, but exercises its independent judgment by weighing
the evidence adduced at the hearing together with any other
evidence properly admitted by the Court. The Court noted
that in the case before it, the plaintiff was seeking a dealer's
license. He did not have one. As a result, the Court was not
dealing with a vested right within the meaning given that term
by the decided cases. 13 The decision indicated that where a
statewide agency affects vested rights, the Superior Court may
exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence produced before the administrative agency, together
with any other evidence properly admitted by the Court. The
Court had in mind Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5
(d), limiting introduction of evidence outside the record to
that relevant evidence that in the exercise of due diligence
could not have been produced at the administrative hearing
or that was offered there and was erroneously excluded. Indeed, the state Supreme Court cited section 1094.5 subdivision
(d), and indicated that the Superior Court cannot, at will,
admit simply any evidence it deems relevant.
For example, in Barkin v. Board of Optometry,l4 a comprehensive and especially well-written opinion, the Court deter-
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lished if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law,
the decision or order is not supported
by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence.
(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence,
in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent
judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not sup:
ported by the weight of the evidence;
and in all other cases abuse of discre258

tion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light
of the whole record." (Italics are the
court's.)
13. The court cites especially Southern California Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d
167, 223 P.2d 1, and McDonough v.
Goodcel, 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035,
123 A.L.R. 1205 (1939).
14. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969).
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mined that the trial court was correct in refusing to receive
evidence. This was a mandamus proceeding to review a decision of the Board of Optometry disciplining an optometrist
licensee; a limited trial de novo could properly be held. The
offered evidence was to the effect that the members of the
board were prejudiced against the licensee. The petition,
however, did not charge bias and prejudice, and made no showing why such evidence could not have been made a part of
the record at the administrative level pursuant to section
1094.5 subdivision (d). The petitioner had the burden of
showing either that through the exercise of reasonable diligence such evidence could not have been produced at the administrative hearing, or that he attempted to produce it and
that it was erroneously excluded. Mere speCUlation that
neither the hearing officer nor the board would have allowed
a showing of this kind could not excuse the petitioner's failure to offer the evidence. 15
In Orr v. Superior Court,16 the state Supreme Court evolved
yet another test in reviewing a decision of the Department of
Motor Vehicles that suspended a license pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Law. 17 The Department of Motor Vehicles
had contended that on a showing that a driver had been involved in an automobile accident involving damages of the
statutory level,18 the driver would have to demonstrate ability
to respond in damages or face suspension of his license;
whether or not the driver was at fault was not material. The
driver claimed that due process entitled him to a complete
hearing before the department and/or the superior court,
where the department had to establish culpability.
The earlier case of Escobedo v. State of California 19 indicated that the license might be suspended without the necessity
of a hearing, and contained some dicta to the effect that if the
15. Petitioner argued because of the
provisions of Government Code §
11512, providing that an agency member shall not withdraw or be subject to
disqualification if this disqualification
would prevent the existence of a quorum to act in a particular case.
CAL LAW 1970
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16. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816,
454 P.2d 712 (1969).
17. Vehicle Code § 16080.
18. Vehicle Code § 16000.
19. 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
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particular driver was not at fault his license should not be
suspended. The court in Orr reviewed not only Escobedo, but
cases such as Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission 20 and
Endler v. Schutzbank/ which involved essential rights and the
necessity for a hearing. The Court concluded that before ordering the suspension of a license, the department must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment
may be recovered against the driver, and so must consider the
issue of culpability. However, it is not required that the Department of Motor Vehicles decide as between conflicting
versions of the accident whether the driver was in fact at fault.
H there is any credible evidence on which he could possibly
be considered culpable, the Court states such evidence could
be believed by the trier of fact in a lawsuit, and will suffice to
support a determination that it is reasonably possible that a
judgment may be recovered against the driver.
Justice Burke, speaking in Orr, states:
Neither is the department called upon to make sophisticated judgments upon any claim or [sic] contributory
negligence or of last clear chance, etc., which may arise;
such claims commonly turn in the first instance upon determinations of disputed facts, and as such such determinations are not the responsibility of the department.
Even if the facts are conceded, questions of contributory negligence and of last clear chance, if at all close
or intricate, will not serve to defeat a decision by the department that a judgment against the involved driver is
reasonably possible . . . .2
With respect to court review of a department order suspending a license, the driver alleging nonculpability is entitled to a
review of the evidence submitted to the department, so that
the court can determine whether it supports the implied finding that there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment for
damages will be rendered against the driver (and owner).
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20. 65 Cal.2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673,
418 P.2d 265 (1966).
1. 68 Cal.2d 162, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297,
436 P.2d 297 (1968).
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2. 71 Cal.2d - , - , 77 Cal. Rptr.
816, 821,454 P.2d 712, 717 (1969).
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The issue is not that indicated by the trial court in this case,
that is, whether the driver was actually without fault. Instead,
the issue is only whether the evidence before the department
supports its implied finding of the reasonable possibility of
judgment, and, accordingly, it is appropriate to limit the scope
of review to a review of the department's action, rather than
permit an unlimited new trial on the issue of fault.
No cases have arisen since the decision in Orr v. Superior
Court,3 but it is apparent that the only concern of a reviewing
court will be whether the decision of the department is reasonable; this is more akin to a substantial evidence case than it is
to a limited trial de novo case. It would appear that so long
as the determination of the department is reasonable without
resort to working out sophisticated concepts of contributory
negligence, last clear chance, and other doctrines, the agency
will be upheld. Where the Superior Court can exercise its independent judgment on appeal, the reviewing court looks to
the record to see if there is substantial evidence, including
reasonable inferences, to support the findings and judgment
of the Superior Court.4 If the decision is supported by substantial evidence, it will be affirmed. 5
D. Penalties Ordered by Administrative Agencies
The reviewing courts have indicated quite clearly in both
Imperial Termite Control, Inc. v. Structural Pest Control
Board6 and West Romaine Corp. v. California State Board of
Pharmacy,7 that the courts, superior as well as reviewing, are
without power to review the extent of a penalty imposed by an
administrative agency, as long as the penalty is within administrative limits and there has been no abuse of discretion.
Indeed, one reviewing court appears to have expressed impatience with a trial court that attempted to invade the discre3. 71 Ca1.2d - , 77 Cal. Rptr. 816,
454 P.2d 712 (1969).
4. Val Strough Chevrolet Co. v.
Bright, 269 Cal. App.2d 855, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 363 (1969).
5. See Walker v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79
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Cal. Rptr. 433 (1969) and Ianusch v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal.
App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969).
6. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
156 (1969).
7. 266 Cal. App.2d 901, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1968).
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tion of a board, in spite of a warning to the trial court contained in an unpublished opinion in a prior appeal of the case. 8
VI. Some Constitutional Questions Incidental to Administrative Law

A. Due Process in Prior Convictions
Under Vehicle Code section 13352, the Department of
Motor Vehicles is required to suspend the driving privileges
of a driver who, within a seven-year period, is twice convicted
of drunk driving. As the result of People v. Cofjey,9 drivers
have been asserting in the second or subsequent proceeding
that the first conviction was void because the driver was deprived of his right to counsel. Consequently, there have been
attempts by some traffic courts, in the second or subsequent
proceeding, to declare invalid a first drunk driving conviction,
citing Cofjey.
In the case of Mitchell v. Orr/o a driver had suffered a forfeiture of bail while in Florida. Later, he was brought before
the Municipal Court in California on a subsequent charge of
drunk driving, and there he attempted to attack the forfeiture
of bail which took place out of the state. The Municipal
Court, in the second drunk driving case, ruled that the prior
forfeiture of bail was void on the basis of Cofjey. The reviewing court held that this determination was binding on the Department of Motor Vehicles, and while the duty to suspend
for a second conviction was mandatory, the department should
have felt bound by the determination of the traffic court. A
forfeiture of bail is deemed the equivalent of a conviction in
California, under the Vehicle Code. It would be hard to determine how Mitchell could possibly have been deprived of
his right to counsel, as contemplated by Cofjey, where he had
forfeited bail. There was never any contention made in
Mitchell that the state authorities by duress, coercion, or other-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

8. 266 Cal. App.2d 901, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1968).
9. 67 Cal.2d 204, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457,
430 P.2d 15 (1967).
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10. 268 Cal. App.2d 813, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 407 (1969).
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wise compelled his forfeiture of bail and kept him away from
counsel. The best that can be gleaned from the record of the
case is that the driver was never expressly advised of his right
to counsel and therefore People v. Coffey applied. Query: Is
the traffic court clerk compelled to advise every motorist who
wishes to forfeit bail of his right to counsel at the time he
posts bail for various offenses ranging from moving violations
to minor parking offenses?
However, in the case of De La Vigne v. Department at Motor Vehicles,l1 the Court reaffirmed the position that the department is bound by a subsequent determination of a traffic court
that a prior conviction was invalid. At present, there are no
reported cases discussing the question of what happens in the
absence of a determination by the traffic court with respect
to the prior conviction. Normally, the prior conviction is
pleaded, and under Vehicle Code section 23102, if found, its
existence is reflected in the penalty. However, there are cases
where the prior conviction is stricken by the district attorney
on his own motion and its validity is not then raised by the
pleadings. The petitioner in Stenback v. Municipal Court/ 2
attempted to have a pretrial determination as to the validity
of prior convictions. The Court held that there is no such
right, but that the convictions could be challenged at the time
of arraignment for judgment. At that time, the court will
have before it the Department of Motor Vehicles' record involving the driver under Vehicle Code section 13209, and,
as a part of the allocation, the driver may contest the validity
of the prior convictions. It would appear that if the state is
bound by a determination of the traffic court, a determination
would also seem to be binding on the driver. On the other
hand, where he does not raise the question of validity (1) by
a pretrial determination (2) during trial or (3) at the allocution, it could be argued that he has waived the right to do so.
Perhaps the driver would be barred by some concept akin to
res judicata or collateral estoppel, if he suffers a judgment that
assumes the validity of the prior conviction.
11. 272 Cal. App.2d 820, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 675 (1969).
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12. 272 Cal. App.2d - , 76 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1969).
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B. Economic Regulations and Due Process
Barkin v. Board of Optometry,13 concerns economic regulation in the sense that the Board of Optometry was enforcing
regulations that forbade using an assumed name in advertising. The licensee claimed that the agency unlawfully and illegally discriminated against him, citing the United States
Supreme Court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.14 The contention was made that other similarly operated organizations were
allowed to so advertise and the board was making no effort
to curtail them. The Court, however, discerned that there
were differences between the licensee's operation and the other
organizations, and held that these differences warranted the
conclusion that there was a rational distinction between the
two. The court held to be constitutional a statute that limited
certain licentiates, particularly in the healing arts, from indicating that the cost of their services were at a discount or less
than the costs generally available in the community. The
Court also held this statute was not an undue restriction on
the right of free speech, although it was asserted by the licensee that he was disciplined for aiding unions in composing
material that the union sent out or distributed.

C. Free Speech
In Los Angeles Teachers' Union v. Los Angeles City Board
of Education/ 5 the Court held that First Amendment rights

guaranteed by the United States Constitution protected employees of a school district in their circulation of a petition on
noninstruction time. The teachers sought to circulate a petition during their duty-free lunch period. The Court observed
that school teachers, like others, have the right to speak freely
and effectively on public questions. The Court was seeking
to balance the interest of a teacher as a citizen in commenting
upon matters of public concern, and the interest of the state
as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public serv-
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13. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969).
14. 118 U.S. 356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6
S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
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15. 71 Cal.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 723,
455 P.2d 827 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
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ice. This case illustrates the trend toward greater recognition
of the rights of public employees, as well as the limitation on
administrators who would impair First Amendment freedoms
for the purpose of curbing disharmony, inconvenience, and
unrest. If the school district were concerned that discussion
during the noon hour involving off-duty teachers would disturb
other teachers engaged in planning work or engaged in other
phases of their instructional duties, the Court said that the
way to handle this was not to abolish speech, but to adopt
some type of regulation prohibiting unduly raucous discussions of any sort in any room where teachers are engaged in
planning work or similar activities.
According to Dunbar v. Governing Board of the Grossmont
Junior College District/ 6 a governing board of a junior college
district has the right to determine, control, and direct the educational program offered at the college during regular school
hours, but such regulation is subject to limitations imposed by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
question arose because an organization, limited to students
registered at the school, wished to present a debate on the
Vietnam war between a member of the John Birch Society
and a member of the Communist Party. The school board
rejected the Communist speaker, apparently because he was
a member of the Communist Party of the United States. The
Court held the school board did not have to open the
campus to the speakers. However, once it opened its doors,
the board had to then observe the restrictions and limitations
contained in the First Amendment and not discriminate
against speakers. Apparently, as part of its educational program, the district could be more restrictive in choosing its
speakers than if the forum had been opened to the general
public. The Court concluded, in this respect, that the school
authorities could reject a speaker because of the trivial nature
of the subject matter, or because of the speaker's lack of expertise, intelligence, or other qualifications that would bear on
the ability to make a meaningful contribution to the educa16. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 662 (1969). For further discusCAL LAW 1970
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tional program. But, in controlling speech on campus, once
a forum for guest speakers has been set up as part of an educational program, the district could not exercise unbridled
censorship.

VII. Public Employees and Administrative Law
There have been a number of cases of special interest to
public employees. In Almond v. County of Sacramento,17 an
action seeking to reinstate civil service employees previously
discharged for being absent without leave while participating
in a strike, the Court held that public employees have no right
to strike, and their absence could not be justified because of
the fact that they were on strike. The local civil service commission was found not to have abused its discretion in determining that the employees were absent without leave. The
Court, in Almond, cited several cases in support of the view
that in the absence of legislative authorization, public employees in general do not have the right to strike. 1s The rule
was settled, and the Court felt bound by it. 19
In Gubser v. Department of Empioyment,20 the Court defined the term "inexcusable neglect of duty" found in Government Code section 19572 subdivision (d), which is one of
several grounds for dismissal of a state employee, to mean
"an intentional or grossfully negligent failure to exercise due
diligence in the performance of a known official duty." Apparently, the Court took the view that the expression remains
an abstraction until viewed in the light of the facts surrounding a particular case. Employees in some of the field offices
of the Department of Employment apparently grossly and
falsely inflated the number of job placements, and the
17. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1969).
18. For example, see Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transit Authority v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54
Cal.2d 684, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d
905 (1960).
19. Recent legislation found in Gov-
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ernment Code §§ 3500 to 3509, relating to recognition of public employees'
organizations, did not provide a statute
to the contrary even as amended in
1968.
20. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1969).
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petitioner-supervisor of these employees was charged with inexcusable neglect of duty in that he knew, or should have
known, the reports were false. The Court stated that the
supervisor had a duty to determine that the basic statistics on
which the project was grounded were truthful; otherwise, there
would have been little reason for having a supervisor at all.
The Court deemed it futile to argue that the supervisor was
under no duty to verify reports submitted by his subordinates,
by even a spot check, simply because no one had ordered the
supervisor to do so. The Court considered it to be an inherent
duty of the supervisor to see that the reports made under his
command were correct.
In Ferdig v. State Personnel Board/ the state Supreme
Court held that the State Personnel Board acted properly in
setting aside the appointment of an employee who had been
erroneously treated as a veteran, when in fact his service in the
merchant marine did not qualify him for veterans' preference
credits. Apparently, the employee had presented discharge
papers showing service in the United States Naval Reserve, as
distinguished from the United States Navy, to establish his
veterans' preference. Although another record presented
showed his service to be in wartime service in the merchant
marine, the employing department notified the State Personnel
Board that the employee had the necessary veterans' points to
move him up to the No.4 position on the list. Later, a question was raised with the department for whom the employee
worked, and, as a result, the State Personnel Board determined
that the veteran's points were not properly granted the employee. His appointment to a civil service position was revoked. The state Supreme Court in Ferdig upheld the determination by the State Personnel Board that the prior treatment
of the employee was improper and against the law, and that
if the employee were not a veteran, he could not continue to
be so treated. Because the State Personnel Board has only
those powers conferred on it by the state Constitution and
statutes, the employee could not be given rights contrary to
1. 71 Cal.2d - , 77 Cal. Rptr. 224,
453 P.2d 728 (1969).
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these basic laws. As a result, the State Personnel Board had
jurisdiction to take corrective action with respect to the appointment. Although there are various grounds for discharging a state employee from civil service, the inclusion of this
kind of mistake need not be enumerated, for it defied logic
to say that the mere enumeration in the statute of the methods
of separating employees from civil service where the appointment had been validly made, compels the conclusion that no
jurisdiction exists to rectify the action of the board where the
appointment had been made without authority. The appointment being illegal, the revocation of the appointment was
proper, and this was so even though the probationary period
relating to employees had run.
In Hamm v. City of Santa Ana,2 the employee submitted his
resignation on a form furnished by the city. An ordinance
provided that the City Manager might permit the withdrawal
of a resignation filed within 10 days of its effective date. The
question was posed whether a resignation of an officer effective
at a future date may be subsequently withdrawn prior to the
date stated in the written resignation. The Court reviewed
a number of cases3 and concluded that it was forced to deal
with the method of resignation withdrawal provided by the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9

2. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
102 (1969).
3. People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26 (1855),
wherein the state Supreme Court held
that the tenure of an officer does not
depend upon the will of the executive
but on the incumbent. The court in
Hamm commented that the author of
the Supreme Court opinion had stated
that he had no doubt that before the
stated date the resignation could have
been withdrawn. This observation was
treated by the court of appeal as being
obiter dicta because the resignation had
not been so withdrawn, nor was there
any attempt to do so. In People v.
Marsh, 30 Cal. App. 424, 159 P. 191
(1916), a resignation was signed and
delivered, addressed to the board of
supervisors, effective upon its being
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filed. Six days after filing, the board
accepted the resignation, although on
the same day that the board met and
before any action was taken on the
resignation, a revocation had been
served on each member of the board.
The court in Marsh held that the common-law doctrine, permitting revocation
of a resignation before acceptance had
been abrogated by the provisions of
law, now Government Code §§ 1750,
1770, gave the incumbent the absolute
right to resign without any restrictions.
Hence, the resignation was effective
when the revocation was not. In Meeker v. Reed, 70 Cal. App. 119, 232 P.
760 (1924), the court had indicated
that no acceptance was necessary to
make a resignation effective.
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legislative body, and since the employee apparently did not
comply with the ordinance permitting a withdrawal, the resignation remained effective. 4
In California State Employees Association v. Regents of the
University of California,5 the Court determined that the provisions of Government Code sections 1150 through 1157,
dealing with salary deductions from state employees and officers for the purpose inter alia of paying dues in employee organizations, did not apply to the employees of the University
of California. There is nothing in those statutes, the Court
held, requiring that university employees be treated as part
of the state government for purposes of payroll deductions.
While for many purposes university employees are state employees,6 whether they are state employees for purposes of the
application of any specific code section will be determined by
looking at the statutes, with reference to the whole system of
law of which they are a part. The Government Code had
within its provisions special definitions interpreted so as to
exclude the University of California from the scope of the
legislation. 7
In Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 8 a school teacher
had been suspended on charges that she was incompetent due
to mental disability, the information relating to this incompetency being based on stale evidence. In an earlier appeal,
the reviewing court had held that the trial court could not base
its decision in proceedings under the Education Code9 on such
out-of-date expert testimony. In a retrial of the matter, the
school district sought the appointment of a psychiatrist who
could make a current psychiatric evaluation of the teacher.
The trial court denied the request. The reviewing court in
Board of Trustees held that unless it was proper to cause
a teacher to submit to a psychiatric examination by a qualified
4. See also French v. State Board of
Education, 265 Cal. App.2d 955, 71
Cal. Rptr. 713 (1968).
5. 267 Cal. App.2d 667, 73 Cal. Rptr.
449 (1968).
6. For example, Tolman v. Underhill. 39 Cal.2d 708.294 P.2d 280 (1952)
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39 Cal.2d 717, 249 P.2d 283 (1952).
7. Govt. Code §§ 1150-1157.5.
8. 274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
58 (1969).
9. Ed. Code §§ 13412 and 13417.
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expert, the proceedings under Education Code section 13412,
would be rendered useless and, thus, there was good cause to
procure the examination. The Court not only ordered the
Superior Court to require an examination, but, in addition,
stated that it would not condition its peremptory writ on an
order that a court reporter and the teacher's counsel be present
during the psychiatric examination. Due to the atmosphere
required by psychiatric examination, its purpose would be
defeated by such procedures.
VIII. Rules and Regulations
One of the more interesting cases deciding matters of rules
and regulations was Yeoman v. Department of Motor Vehicles/o which held that a statute giving the State Board of Education authority to adopt reasonable regulations concerning
operation of school buses did not confer on the board authority to direct the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue certificates for school buses. The discussion centered on the authority of one agency of government over another. The
agencies involved were coordinate branches of the executive
branch of government, with the Board of Education having no
constitutional power to assert supremacy over the Department
of Motor Vehicles or to make regulations binding on the Department of Motor Vehicles. The regulation as adopted could
not have the effect of enlarging the grant of power under which
the Board of Education acted. While the regulation itself
was invalid, the legislature adopted a later measure that validated the procedure followed, and conferred on the Department of Motor Vehicles the power to issue school bus licenses.
Having enforced certain rules and regulations of the Board
of Education, the Department of Motor Vehicles was held by
the Court to have effectively adopted such rules without having formally accepted the regulatory scheme. Thus, the Court
announced that one agency's rules and regulations may be informally adopted by another. The two departments decided
10. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 CaL
Rptr. 251 (1969).
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upon a cooperative adjustment by which the Department of
Motor Vehicles issues certificates based on standards partly
of its own creation and partly the creation of the Board of
Education.
IX. Qualifications of Licensees
In Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,l1
the Court held that a conviction for failing to report and fully
pay federal income taxes was a conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Earlier, in the case of In re Hallinan/ 2 the
state Supreme Court held that this type of conviction was not
a crime that inherently involved moral turpitude. Subsequently, federal cases determined that the offense, described
by 26 U.S.C. section 7201, involves a charge of fraud and a
conviction thereof is based on a finding of fraud. Additionally, a host of other cases were cited to show that fraud
was a necessary ingredient to a conviction, and, hence, moral
turpitude is involved.
In H. D. Wallace & Associates v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control/ 3 the Court did not have before it the question of moral turpitude as in Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,14 but it did have the question of whether
a liquor licensee might be disciplined because of a record of
misdemeanor drunk driving. The Court took the position that
this did not involve moral turpitude, and that it had not been
demonstrated that there was a connection between the infractions of the licensee and the conduct of the licensed business. The Court ignored the fact, however, that the asserted
misconduct involved the misuse of alcohol, the very commodity that the licensee was licensed to sell. The Court apparently took the position that insobriety on and off the highway had no actual effect on the conduct of the licensed business. The view of the Court seems narrow. It does not concern itself with the nature of the commodity sold or the right
11. 270 Cal. App.2d 535, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 823 (1969).
12. 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768
(1954).
CAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

13.
Rptr.
14.
Rptr.

271
749
270
823

Cal. App.2d 589, 76 Cal.
(1969).
Cal. App.2d 535, 75 Cal.
(1969).
271

49

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 9

Administrative Law

of the state to protect itself in advance of the apprehended
evil. This should be contrasted with Saunders v. City of Los
Angeles/ 5 where conviction of bookmaking was held to be a
rational basis to deny renewal of a license to operate an automobile repair business.
On the other hand, in the case of Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board/ 6 the Court took the position that
where the licensee was found to have employed a minor on
his premises in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25663, a good-faith reliance by the licensee on some evidence of the employee's majority was not a defense. Business
and Professions Code section 25660, sets forth certain statutory requisites for establishing this defense, and the Court
held that this statute must be satisfied. In order that there
be a defense under the latter section, which also is a defense
for serving liquor to a minor, the licensee has the dual burden
of showing not only that he acted in good faith, free from the
intent to violate the law, but that he exercised good faith in
reliance on the kind of documentary evidence contemplated
by the section.
15. 273 Cal. App. 2d - , 78 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume.
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